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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The preservation of historic structures provides communities across the 
nation with both a source of pride in our national history and a window 
through which to view that history. Governments‘ powers of eminent 
domain have long served as a tool for historic preservation; however, 
eminent domain also facilitates the destruction of historic structures. Thus, 
commentators have referred to eminent domain as a double-edged sword 
for historic preservation.
1
 With the 2005 Kelo v. City of New London 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court altered the field of permissible 
condemnations, validating governments‘ constitutional authority to 
condemn non-blighted neighborhoods for private redevelopment.
2
 States 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2011, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I would like to thank Laura and 
Anna Marie for their love and support. I would also like to thank Professors Timothy E. McLendon 
and Michael Allan Wolf, whose advice and feedback helped make this Note possible.  
 1. See Adrian Scott Fine, Eminent Domain: A Double-Edged Sword for Historic 
Preservation, 39 F.J.: J. OF THE NAT‘L TR. FOR HIST. PRESERVATION 22 (2005). 
 2. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (allowing the City of 
1
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responded by reining in their governments‘ condemnation powers.3 With 
the dust from the states‘ legislative flurry seemingly settled, it appears that 
eminent domain still cuts both ways in the realm of historic preservation. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the federal 
government to pay just compensation when it takes private property for a 
public use.
4
 Since 1897, the Supreme Court has incorporated this 
requirement against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
5
 What constitutes a public use has evolved 
considerably over the years, with the general trend toward a steadily more 
inclusive definition.
6
 The evolution hit a high point with the Supreme 
Court‘s Kelo decision. In an opinion penned by Justice John Paul Stevens, 
the Kelo Court held that the use of eminent domain to transfer non-blighted 
private property to a private industry in the name of economic 
redevelopment satisfied the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.
7
 
Justice Stevens noted, however, that though the federal Constitution 
permitted such transfers, ―nothing . . . precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.‖8  
 The public responded strongly to the Court‘s holding, with 
commentators nationwide decrying the decision as an affront to long-held 
notions of property rights.
9
 The states quickly took heed, and within a 
matter of months, legislatures across the country were crafting new laws to 
rein in eminent domain.
10
 As of 2009, thirty-six states have enacted such 
legislation.
11
 When counted alongside the states that reformed eminent 
domain through popular referendum, at least forty-two of the nation‘s fifty 
states had engaged in eminent domain reform by 2009.
12
  
 The enactments vary in content and in strength.
13
 Some added 
substantive reforms that narrowed eminent domain powers; others were 
                                                                                                                     
New London, Connecticut, to use eminent domain powers to condemn private property for a private 
redevelopment effort). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V (―[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.‖). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
241 (1897) (incorporating the Takings Clause against the states). 
 6. For an overview of the historical progression of the public use clause, see Ellen Frankel 
Paul, Public Use: A Vanishing Limitation on Governmental Takings, 4 CATO J. 835 (1985). 
 7. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
 8. Id. at 489. 
 9. For discussion of the public reaction, see Michael Allan Wolf, Hysteria Versus History: 
Public Use in the Public Eye, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT 
DOMAIN 15, 15–17 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008). 
 10. CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND USE PLANNING AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: A CASEBOOK 240–41 (2010).   
 11. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 2100, 2105 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 2115–16 tbl.4. 
 13. See generally Julia H. Miller & Heather Amrhein, State Legislation Addressing Eminent 
Domain and Regulatory Takings, SM056 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 791 (2007).  
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merely procedural reforms that added hurdles to the process.
14
 Numerous 
reforms ushered in changes to the definition of public use and to the 
definition of blight in regards to blight eradication as a public use.
 15
 All of 
the reforms had the basic goal of protecting private property owners from 
overreaching governments.
16
 This Note will focus on the blight provisions 
and the effects these provisions will have on the goals of historic 
preservation.   
A general trend of the reforms is to prohibit the use of eminent domain 
when the end result will be to transfer a condemned property to a private 
entity; however, many states carve out an exemption to the prohibition if 
the private-to-private transfer is not the ultimate goal but rather a means to 
achieve the goal of blight eradication.
17
 Prior to Kelo, most states defined 
blight broadly.
18
 As part of their post-Kelo reform efforts, approximately 
twenty states either narrowed the definition of blight or removed blight as a 
justification for private-to-private transfers.
19
 A few states, including 
Florida and New Mexico, totally eliminated the use of blight as a rationale 
for eminent domain.
20
 In each of these twenty states, historic buildings will 




 Other states narrowed the definition of public use yet left their blight 
definitions so wide that condemning authorities could apply the label to 
almost any building.
22
 As there is a correlation between a building‘s age 
and the likelihood it will be designated blight, many historic buildings in 
older neighborhoods remain at risk of condemnation in the name of blight 
removal. Some states specifically include factors such as age and 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See generally id. 
 15. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79F.03[3][b][iv] (Michael Allan Wolf rev. online ed., 
LexisNexis 2009). In addition to these changes, the reforms increased public notice and hearing 
requirements, shifted to the government the burden of showing a public use and need, and added 
provisions for attorneys‘ fees, relocation assistance, additional compensation for residential 
condemnations, and opportunities for owner buy-back should the government not timely pursue the 
public use. Id.  
 16. See generally Miller & Amrhein, supra note 13. 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. Somin, supra note 11, at 2121. 
 19. Id. at 2138–46. Nineteen of the approximately twenty states narrowed the definition of 
blight. South Dakota did not alter its blight definition but eliminated it as a justification for private-
to-private transfers. This substantially reduces a local government‘s incentive to designate a 
building as blighted. Id. at 2139.  
 20. Id. at 2138. One commentator has labeled Florida‘s reforms as ―probably the most 
important post-Kelo legislative victory for property rights activists.‖ Id. at 2139. For analysis and 
criticism of Florida‘s eminent domain reform, see generally Scott J. Kennelly, Note, Florida‟s 
Eminent Domain Overhaul: Creating More Problems than It Solved, 60 FLA. L. REV. 471 (2008). 
 21. Interestingly, historic homes may find themselves safer in Florida, a state that conjures up 
notions of newness and fast-track development, than they would be in many old colonial states. By 
some counts, nine of the thirteen original colonies have had either no reform or ineffective reform: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode 
Island, and South Carolina. See id. at 2115 tbl.4.  
 22. Id. at 2120. 
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obsolescence in their blight definitions.
23
 This further exacerbates the risk 
eminent domain poses to historic buildings. Due to the economic 
downturn, many local governments lack the finances to engage in costly 
condemnations. However, once the economy rebounds and municipal 
coffers are refilled, there is little to prevent abuse in the states with broad 
use of blight as an eminent domain justification.
24
 
 Despite eminent domain‘s risk to historic preservation, the practice 
benefits preservation as well. The Supreme Court validated historic 
preservation as a public use in the 1896 decision United States v. 
Gettysburg Railway Co.
25
 Although specifically validating preservation of 
historic battlefields, later courts expanded the holding to validate 
condemnation for historic preservation in other contexts.
26
 With judicial 
approval, governments have condemned both historic buildings
27
 and 
parcels neighboring historic buildings to make way for accessory uses such 
as expanded parking
28
 and museum space.
29
  
 Due to the high costs involved in taking title to historic buildings, 
preservation through regulation is far more common than preservation 
through eminent domain.
30
 However, there are times when a landowner‘s 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See infra notes 87–101 and accompanying text. 
 24. Further, as local governments continue to turn to creative financing schemes such as tax 
increment financing, there will be continuing pressure to replace older ―blighted‖ areas with 
economic redevelopment that increases the tax base. 
 25. 160 U.S. 668, 681–83 (1896). 
 26. See, e.g., Cordova v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52, 53–54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (citing 
Gettysburg Railway Co. for the proposition that, ―[I]t has long been established that a taking to 
preserve historic property represents a proper ‗public use.‘‖); Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Council 
of Baltimore, 71 A.2d 12, 14 (Md. 1950) (upholding the taking of property near a historic landmark 
for the purposes of historic preservation); In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d 551, 
552–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (permitting the acquisition of property without a public hearing for 
the purpose of ―emergency stabilization and historic preservation‖); Lubelle v. City of Rochester, 
145 A.D.2d 954, 954–55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (upholding the taking of vacant lots and a historic 
building for the purpose of historic preservation); City of Tacoma v. Zimmerman, 82 P.3d 701, 
703–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the acquisition of property with a historic building that 
had fallen into disrepair). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d at 551–53 (historic 
church). 
 28. See Lubelle, 145 A.D.2d at 954–55. 
 29. See Flaccomio, 71 A.2d at 12–14.  
 30. In the state court opinion that preceded the U.S. Supreme Court‘s opinion in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), New York‘s highest court 
reasoned that although preservation regulations are permissible in times of economic hardship, in 
times of affluence, eminent domain is certainly desirable and possibly mandatory. Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278 (N.Y. 1977). Though affirming the court‘s 
holding, the U.S. Supreme Court did not address this aspect of the New York court‘s decision. The 
Supreme Court did, however, remove any doubt over the federal constitutionality of preservation 
regulations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. In the years since this decision, local 
preservation ordinances have spread across the country. Estate of Tippett v. City of Miami, 645 So. 
2d 533, 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (―At the time the Court issued Penn Central, all 50 states and 
more than 500 municipalities had enacted preservation laws. In 1992, local historic preservation 
ordinances numbered more than 1700.‖ (internal citations omitted)). For an overview of the history 
and implementation of historic preservation ordinances, see NORMAN TYLER, TED J. LIGIBEL & ILENE 
4
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lack of fiscal resources or refusal to cooperate makes eminent domain the 
preferred option. Municipalities have used this option over the years and, 
on occasion, have transferred historic buildings to private entities with the 
means and interest to engage in rehabilitation.
31
  
Condemnation has not always been the first line of attack.
32
 In some 
instances, local governments first demanded landowners fix dilapidated 
historic structures. When the landowners refused, eminent domain 
ensued.
33
 Though patently constitutional in light of the Supreme Court‘s 
Gettysburg decision,
34
 the condemnations for preservation were more 
palatable to the community because they were coupled with the public use 
of blight eradication. This likely helped get the local community on board, 
an essential part of a successful eminent domain proceeding.  
In several jurisdictions with strong post-Kelo reforms, it is questionable 
whether a public use of historic preservation coupled with blight 
eradication would pass state statutory or constitutional muster. In other 
jurisdictions, such schemes clearly would not pass muster unless the 
structure satisfied blight definitions that are now considerably more 
stringent than in years past. These laws restrict too greatly governments‘ 
ability to condemn historic structures for historic preservation. 
Jurisdictions with strong post-Kelo reform should modify their eminent 
domain statutes to more readily allow blight designations to justify eminent 
domain when the goal of the condemnation is to preserve a historic 
structure.  
Conversely, in the weak reform jurisdictions, economic redevelopment 
condemnations are only slightly more difficult to effectuate than they were 
pre-Kelo. The new laws fail to provide historic structures adequate 
protection from the private developer‘s wrecking ball. Historic 
preservation proponents should advocate for stronger protection of historic 
                                                                                                                     
R. TYLER, HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 
155–88 (2d ed. 2009). See generally CONSTANCE E. BEAUMONT, NAT‘L TRUST FOR HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION, A CITIZEN‘S GUIDE TO PROTECTING HISTORIC PLACES: LOCAL PRESERVATION 
ORDINANCES: SMART GROWTH TOOLS FOR MAIN STREET (2002), available at 
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/smart-growth/additional-resources/toolkit_citizens.pdf.    
 31. See In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d at 551–53 (permitting the 
acquisition of St. Joseph‘s Church). Though not discussed in the case, Albany transferred its newly 
acquired title to St. Joseph‘s Church to the private historic preservation organization Historic 
Albany Foundation. February 2011 St. Joseph‟s Newsletter, HISTORIC ALBANY FOUND., 
http://www.historic-albany.org/stjosephs.html (last visited May 9, 2011); see also Cordova, 494 
P.2d at 54 (―The mere fact that the property will be leased to a private corporation or individual 
does not invalidate the condemnation.‖); Zimmerman, 82 P.3d at 704 (―The City plans to put the 
building ‗into the hands of a successful bidder through a request for proposal to put the building 
back in to viable use.‘‖ (external citation omitted)). 
 32. See In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d at 552–53 (involving case where 
owner first ordered to vacate and make repairs); Tacoma, 82 P.3d at 703–04 (involving case where 
owner ordered to make repairs and issued several citations before initiation of condemnation 
proceedings). 
 33. See In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d at 552–53; Tacoma, 82 P.3d at 
703–04. 
 34. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681–83 (1896). 
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buildings in these instances. Blight findings should not be permitted to 
justify the condemnation and destruction of historic structures for 
economic redevelopment unless the structures pose serious health and 
safety hazards. Unless the post-Kelo reforms are amended to better 
promote and protect historic preservation, these reforms, like eminent 
domain itself, represent a double-edged sword for historic preservation. 
This Note will explore the various post-Kelo reforms and evaluate the 
likely ramifications on the historic preservation community. Part II 
summarizes the Kelo opinion and explains how the decision followed and 
extended the Court‘s public use jurisprudence in Gettysburg Railway Co. 
and Berman v. Parker.
35
 Part III discusses and compares the various state 
eminent domain reforms enacted in the aftermath of Kelo, with a focus on 
the blight exemptions and the statutory redefinitions of blight. Part IV 
argues that as a building‘s age is a contributing factor to both its 
designation as blighted and to its designation as historic, statutory 
redefinitions of blight will impact a historic building‘s likelihood of being 
condemned. Part V discusses how courts expanded historic preservation as 
a valid public use and how the strong post-Kelo reforms limit the tools 
available to preservation groups to obtain dilapidated historic properties for 
restoration activities. For example, many local governments will be forced 
to rely solely on historic preservation goals in eminent domain initiatives, a 
less palatable tactic than coupling historic preservation with blight 
eradication. Part VI concludes that to serve the interests embodied by the 
post-Kelo reforms while also effectively preserving historic buildings, 
states with strong reforms should carve out an exception to the blight 
definitions. States should more readily allow disrepair and neglect to 
justify condemnations for historic preservation purposes, yet retain 
stringent blight definitions in all other regards. Conversely, to protect 
historic structures from Kelo‘s loosening of the public use requirement, 
states with weak eminent domain reform should consider legislation 
making it more difficult to condemn and destroy buildings of historical 
significance. 
II.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUBLIC USE: UNITED STATES V. GETTYSBURG 
RAILWAY CO., BERMAN V. PARKER, AND KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON 
A.  United States v. Gettysburg Railway Co. 
To appreciate Kelo, it is helpful to understand the Court‘s prior 
jurisprudence on what constitutes a public use. The recognition that 
historic preservation is a valid public use stems from the 1896 decision 
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co.
36
 In Gettysburg, the U.S. 
Supreme Court scrutinized the condemnation of the Gettysburg 
battlefield.
37
 The federal government condemned the lands to establish a 
                                                                                                                     
 35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 36. Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 681. 
 37. Id. at 679–80. 
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Gettysburg national military reservation.
38
 In a unanimous decision penned 
by Justice Rufus Peckham, the Court addressed whether memorializing the 
historic battlefield satisfied the public use prong of the Fifth Amendment.
39
 
Answering in the affirmative, the Court announced the following: 
Any act of congress which plainly and directly tends to 
enhance the respect and love of the citizen for the institutions 
of his country, and to quicken and strengthen his motives to 
defend them, . . . must be valid. . . . Such a use seems 
necessarily not only a public use, but one so closely connected 
with the welfare of the republic itself as to be within the 
powers granted congress by the constitution for the purpose of 
protecting and preserving the whole country.
40
 
Emphasizing the ―national character and importance‖ of the historic site, 
the Court emphasized that ―[n]o narrow view . . . of this proposed use 
should be taken.‖41 This decision helped pave the way for courts to 
recognize increasingly broad understandings of public use.  
B.  Berman v. Parker 
In the decades following Gettysburg, the Court‘s understanding of 
public use began to encompass the broader idea of public purpose. In the 
1954 case Berman v. Parker,
42
 the Court unanimously affirmed that the 
public purpose of blight eradication satisfied the public use prong of the 
Fifth Amendment.
43
 The Court further emphasized that such eradication 
need not be piecemeal, but rather a city may condemn an entire area even if 
individual lots in that area are not themselves blighted.
44
  
The challenged redevelopment in Berman was a plan to raze and 
redevelop a blighted neighborhood in Washington, D.C., that was home to 
5,000 of the capital‘s residents.45 The plan included construction of roads, 
schools, and various other public facilities as well as the conveyance of the 
remaining land to private parties for construction of low-income residential 
units.
46
 The petitioner, the owner of a non-blighted department store in the 
condemned neighborhood, argued that his business should not be included 
in the redevelopment plan and that creating a ―better balanced, more 
attractive community‖ did not constitute a valid public use.47 Declining the 
store owner‘s plea to evaluate his business in isolation, the Court gave 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 679. 
 40. Id. at 681–82. 
 41. Id. at 683. 
 42. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
 43. Id. at 33. 
 44. Id. at 34–35.  
 45. Id. at 30. 
 46. Id. at 34–35; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (discussing 
the facts of the Berman decision). 
 47. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. 
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deference to the local government‘s decision to redevelop the 
neighborhood as a whole.
48
 Widely defining public use, the Court stated 
that ―[t]he values [public use] represents are spiritual as well as physical, 
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.‖49 
Berman‘s unanimous and sweeping opinion affirmed both the wide 
condemnation powers wielded by local governments and the 
constitutionality of using aesthetics as a public use. 
C.  Kelo v. City of New London 
Half a century after Berman, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Kelo ―to determine whether a city‘s decision to take property for the 
purpose of economic redevelopment satisfies the ‗public use‘ requirement 
of the Fifth Amendment.‖50 The redevelopment plan at issue sought to take 
the economically distressed Fort Trumbull area of New London, 
Connecticut, and replace it with a revitalized downtown and waterfront 
area.
51
 Specifically, the plan sought to raze the existing homes and replace 
them with a Pfizer pharmaceutical research facility, a state park, a 
museum, a pedestrian ―riverwalk,‖ a waterfront conference hotel, and the 
sundry retail shopping and restaurants that would presumably follow such 
development.
52




 Affirming the plan as a valid public use, the five-member majority 
emphasized that the plan was not designed to benefit particular 
individuals.
54
 At the time the plan commenced, the identity of the future 
anchor facility was unknown; Pfizer did not enter the negotiations until 
later in the process.
55
 Accordingly, the Court commented that ―[i]t is, of 
course, difficult to accuse the government of having taken A‘s property to 
benefit the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown.‖56  
 The Court emphasized that the city had carefully planned the details of 
the redevelopment.
57
 As such, the city deserved deference to pursue the 
plan it thought best would achieve the municipal goals of urban 
revitalization, job creation, and an increased tax base.
58
 The Court denied 
that the holding would permit the taking of one‘s property to give to 
another solely because the latter‘s use would produce more tax revenue.59 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 35. 
 49. Id. at 33. 
 50. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
 51. Id. at 473–74. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 475. 
 54. Id. at 478. 
 55. Id. at 478 n.6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 483. 
 58. Id. at 483–84. 
 59. Id. at 486–87. 
8
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The Fort Trumbull plan was well-reasoned and comprehensive;
60
 the Court 
would address more suspicious transfers if and when they arose.
61
 
Writing for a four-member dissent, Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor 
distinguished the Court‘s takings precedent62 and argued that the Kelo 
holding surpassed constitutional limits and endangered property owners 
nationwide.
63
 She highlighted that in both Berman and the 1984 decision 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
64
 condemnations that transferred title 
to private parties remedied preexisting harms—the eradication of blight in 
Berman and the eradication of a housing market oligopoly in Midkiff.
65
 In 
contradistinction, there was no preexisting harm remedied by Kelo‘s Fort 
Trumbull redevelopment plan.
66
 To O‘Connor, the Kelo Court‘s decision 
introduced a ―specter of condemnation [] over all property,‖ a scenario 
where ―[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a 
Ritz-Carlton,‖ just because the latter could be said to be a more efficient 
and lucrative use.
67
 Though the dissenters could not gain a majority, their 
words resoundingly reflected the sentiments of the nation‘s citizens and the 
state legislatures.  
III.  POST-KELO EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM AND THE NARROWING OF 
THE BLIGHT EXEMPTION 
 At least forty-two states have acted on Justice Stevens‘ observation that 
nothing prevents states from imposing public use requirements more 
stringent than those of the Fifth Amendment.
68
 Twenty-nine states enacted 
reform by the end of 2006, a mere year and a half after the Court issued 
Kelo.
69
 Much commentary has been written on the reforms, with authors 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 483–84. 
 61. Id. at 487. 
 62. Id. at 500 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 494. 
 64. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
 65. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). In Midkiff, a unanimous U.S. Supreme 
Court validated the use of eminent domain to break up land oligopoly in Hawaii, allowing Hawaii 
to condemn leased properties and to force the owners to convey fee title to the long-term tenants. 
467 U.S. at 241–45. 
 66. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 503. Also in Kelo, Justice Clarence Thomas filed a separate dissent, in which he 
advocated a return to the view that a public use is only one where either the government actually 
uses the property or else gives the public the right to use the property. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 68. As of 2009, the eight states that have not enacted reform are Arkansas, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Washington. Somin, supra 
note 11, at 2115–16 tbl.4. Though Washington altered its eminent domain law, the change was 
unrelated to Kelo and thus is not included as a post-Kelo reform. See id. at 2115 n.64.  
 69. The states that enacted reform in 2005 and 2006 are, in chronological order: Delaware, 
Alabama, Texas, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Georgia, West 
Virginia, Maine, Nebraska, Vermont, Pennsylvania, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Tennessee, 
Colorado, New Hampshire, Alaska, Missouri, Iowa, Illinois, North Carolina, Michigan, and 
California. HAAR & WOLF, supra note 10, at 240–41.  
9
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opining on matters such as the reforms‘ impacts on the poor,70 the impacts 
on tax increment financing schemes,
71
 the impacts on environmental 
causes,
72
 the impacts on urban revitalization schemes,
73
 and the general 
effectiveness of the reforms in regards to the statutory redefinitions of 
blight.
74
 This Part draws much from the analysis that has been done on the 
statutory redefinitions of blight and summarizes the findings on the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the various reforms. 
 One of the most comprehensive analyses of the post-Kelo reforms is by 
Professor Ilya Somin.
75
 Somin‘s findings closely mirror those published by 
the property-rights public interest group Castle Coalition.
76
 Of the forty-
two states that have enacted eminent domain reform, Somin argues that 
twenty-two have been largely ineffective in restricting eminent domain 
abuse.
77
 Whether intentionally drafted for governments to maintain 
flexibility or whether a result of poor draftsmanship, these twenty-two 
reforms may do little to prevent government abuse of eminent domain.
78
 
Under these reforms, historic properties could easily be designated as 
blighted. As the reforms often exempt blighted properties from the ban on 
condemnation for economic redevelopment, the states with widely defined 
blight statutes leave private property at risk of being condemned and 
transferred to other parties in the name of economic redevelopment.
79
 
 Research shows that sixteen states have enacted post-Kelo reforms that 
use definitions of blight that are either exactly the same or very similar to 
the pre-Kelo definitions of blight.
80
 Ten of the states define blight in 
regards to impediments to ―sound growth‖ or factors contributing to 
―economic or social liability.‖81 Though many of these states‘ statutes list 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See generally Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1931 (2007).  
 71. See generally George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic 
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School 
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45 (2008). 
 72. See generally Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic 
Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623 (2006).   
 73. See generally Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 657 (2007). 
 74. See generally Will Lovell, The Kelo Blowback: How the Newly-Enacted Eminent Domain 
Statutes and Past Blight Statutes Are a Maginot Line-Defense Mechanism for All Non-Affluent and 
Minority Property Owners, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2007); Somin, supra note 11.  
 75. Somin, supra note 11. 
 76. CASTLE COALITION: CITIZENS FIGHTING EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: 
TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (2010), available at 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/about/component/content/2412?tasl=view. The Castle Coalition is a 
project affiliated with the Institute for Justice, the property rights group that represented Susette 
Kelo before the Supreme Court. 
 77. Somin, supra note 11, at 2105. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 2120. 
 80. Id. at 2121. 
 81. Id. at 2121–22. The ten states are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.55.950(2) (West 
2010); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-103(2) (West 2010); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 100.310(2) (West 2010); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-15-4206(2) (West 2010); Nebraska, 
10
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factors that must be considered, and in some instances aggregated, to 
determine an impediment to ―sound growth‖ or an ―economic or social 
liability,‖ these phrases are such malleable constructs that condemning 
authorities could frame most any situation to satisfy them.
82
 The six 
remaining states have blight definitions that, though worded differently, 
could easily be construed to bring in almost any building.
83
 Two additional 
states have blight definitions narrower than the previously discussed 
sixteen, yet still broad enough to bring in buildings whose blight 
designations are of questionable veracity.
84
 In addition to these eighteen 
states, Somin argues that at least four additional states have ineffective 
post-Kelo reforms.
85
 Though ineffective for reasons other than their blight 
provisions, these states‘ reforms still allow substantial governmental 
discretion in exercising eminent domain.
86
  
 A step beyond Somin‘s analysis shows that thirteen of the twenty-two 
states with weak post-Kelo reforms include ―age‖ or ―obsolescence‖ as 
factors contributing to a blight finding: Montana, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, Illinois, Nevada, Maine, Tennessee, Rhode 
Island, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Maryland. Illinois includes ―obsolescence‖ 
but not ―age,‖ and defines ―obsolescence‖ in a way that makes abuse less 
likely than in other states.
87
 However, the blight definition in general is still 
                                                                                                                     
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-2103(11) (West 2010); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-
503(2) (West 2010); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1.08, 303.26(E) (West 2010); Texas, TEX. 
LOC. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (West 2010); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3201(3) 
(West 2010); and West Virginia W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3(c)–(d) (West 2010). Somin, supra 
note 11, at 2122–23. 
 82. Somin, supra note 11, at 2124. 
 83. Id. at 2125–38. The states are: Illinois, 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a) (West 
2010); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.010(1)(q), 279.388(1) (West 2010); Kentucky, KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (West 2010); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101(2) (West 
2010); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (West 2010); and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 42-64.12-1 (West 2010). Somin, supra note 11, at 2125–38. However, Nevada has 
passed a referendum that will eventually add substantial protection against eminent domain. Id. at 
2126.  
 84. Somin, supra note 11, at 2129. Iowa defines blight in regards to ―deteriorated structures‖ 
and ―excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site.‖ See IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22(2)(b)(i) 
(West 2010) (discussed in Somin, supra note 11, at 2129–30). These phrases could be interpreted 
liberally if the Iowa courts so choose. Id. Wisconsin‘s statute gives a broad definition of blight but 
then adds extra protection for single family homes. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(a) (West 2010) 
(discussed in Somin, supra note 11, at 2130–31). 
 85. Somin questions the effectiveness of reform efforts in California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
and Maryland. Somin, supra note 11, at 2131–34.   
 86. Id. (discussing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-193(b)(1), 8-124-25 (West 2010); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 29 § 9505(15) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12-105.1(a) (West 2010); S.B. 
1206, § 2(b)(1), 2005–06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (codified in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 33000 (West 2010)), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-
06/bill/sen/sb_1201-1250/sb_1206_bill_20060929_chaptered.pdf).  
 87. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1)(b) (West 2010) (defining ―obsolescence‖ 
as ―[t]he condition or process of falling into disuse. Structures have become ill-suited for the 
original use‖). 
11
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 Like Illinois, Tennessee includes ―obsolescence‖ but not 
―age,‖89 as does Maryland in its constitutional definition of ―blighted 
area.‖90 However, ―obsolescence‖ is not defined further in either of these 
instances.
91
 Nevada‘s definition includes both ―age‖ and ―obsolescence,‖92 

















 None of 
these states further qualifies what constitutes ―age‖ or ―obsolescence,‖ 
thereby facilitating broad subjectivity on the part of local governments 
wishing to pursue condemnations. Nebraska includes ―age,‖ but not 
―obsolescence,‖ specifically stating that a contributing factor is that ―the 
average age of the residential or commercial units in the area is at least 
forty years.‖101 This use of age as a blight factor seems particularly 
egregious, both setting a low threshold in number of years and allowing 
that threshold to be satisfied by the age of buildings other than the targeted 
building. Nine of the twenty-two states with broad blight definitions list 
neither age nor obsolescence as factors contributing to a blight finding: 




Not all scholars agree that the reforms in these twenty-two states are so 
clearly ineffectual. Professor Michael Allan Wolf‘s scholarship is much 
less critical of the reforms, demonstrating that in states such as Colorado, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin, the reforms may have more substance than 
Somin‘s research indicates.103 In Colorado, for example, the condemning 
authority must rationalize the condemnation by clear and convincing 
evidence, whereas in Missouri, the condemnation must ―be supported by 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Id. § 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1). 
 89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (West 2010). 
 90. MD. CONST. art. III, § 61. 
 91. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 61; TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201(a) (West 2010). 
 92. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.010(1)(q), 279.388(1)(a)(4) (West 2010). 
 93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 5101(2)(A)(1) (West 2010). 
 94. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-31-8(6)(i) (West 2010). 
 95. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 7-15-4206(2)(a) (West 2010). The statute combines the two and 
lists ―age obsolescence‖ as a factor. Id.  
 96. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-503(2) (West  2010). 
 97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.08(B)(2)(b) (West 2010). 
 98. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-18-3(d) (West 2010). 
 99. IOWA CODE ANN. § 6A.22(2)(b)(ii) (West 2010). 
 100. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(a) (West 2010). 
 101. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-2103(11)(ii) (West 2010). 
 102. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.55.950(2) (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-
103(2) (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-193(b)(1), 8-124-25 (West 2010); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 29, § 9505(15) (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (West 2010); MO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 100.310(2) (West 2010); TEX. LOC. GOV‘T CODE ANN. § 374.003(3) (West 2010); 
VT STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3201(3) (West 2010); S.B. 1206, § 2(b)(1), 2005–06 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 2006) (codified in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33000 (West 2010)), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_1201-250/sb_1206_bill_ 20060929_ 
chaptered.pdf. 
 103. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 15, § 79F.03[3][b][iv]. 
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substantial evidence.‖104 In Wisconsin, the blight definition is followed by 
language stating that a single dwelling unit is not blighted ―unless . . . at 
least one of the following applies: 1. The property is not occupied by the 
owner [or the owner‘s family;] 2. The crime rate in, on, or adjacent to the 
property is at least 3 times the crime rate in the remainder of the 
municipality . . . .‖105 Though perhaps not saving the statutes, these 
provisions show a total dismissal of the statutes‘ effectiveness may not be 
appropriate. 
As opposed to the above-discussed reforms, Somin found that twenty 
states have enacted reforms that significantly restrain governments‘ 
condemnation powers.
106
 In states such as New Mexico and Florida, blight 
eradication has in effect been removed from the arsenal of eminent domain 
justifications.
107
 Utah eliminated the blight justification pre-Kelo.
108
 South 
Dakota, Kansas, Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, Virginia, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Arizona, 
Louisiana, Oregon, and North Dakota have all enacted legislation or passed 
constitutional referendums that limit condemnations that transfer properties 
to private parties.
109
 Except for South Dakota, each of these states has 
similarly narrowed the blight definition.
110
 Though retaining its previous 
definition, South Dakota‘s elimination of private-to-private transfers 
removes the incentive for local governments to make a blight finding, thus 
accomplishing the same goal as the states that narrowed the blight 
definition.
111
 Nevada‘s blight statute still defines the term broadly; 
however, a state referendum has been passed that will narrow the 
justifications for eminent domain in the years to come.
112
 South Carolina 
also passed an eminent domain referendum, though the amendment‘s effect 
is unclear.
113
 Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, 







                                                                                                                     
 104. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(2)(b) (West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 523.261 (West 
2010), discussed in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 15, § 79F.03[3][b][iv]. 
 105. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 32.03(6)(a) (West 2010), discussed in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 
supra note 15, § 79F.03[3][b][iv]. Wolf‘s analysis of post-Kelo reform in states such as West 
Virginia and California is likewise less critical than is Somin‘s. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra 
note 15, § 79F.03[3][b][iv]. 
 106. Somin, supra note 11, at 2138–48. 
 107. Id. at 2138. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 2138–46. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2139. 
 112. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.010(1)(q), 279.388(1) (West 2010); see Somin, supra note 
11, at 2126. 
 113. Somin, supra note 11, at 2145–46. 
 114. Id. at 2115–16 tbl.3. 
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IV.  THE EFFECTS OF THE BLIGHT EXEMPTIONS ON HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION 
The post-Kelo eminent domain reforms will produce varied 
implications for the governments that wield condemnation powers, the 
citizens whose property governments desire, and the citizens who are 
affected by the condemnation of their neighbors‘ properties. As there is a 
correlation between a building‘s age and the likelihood it will be 
designated blight, the reforms with narrowed definitions or use of blight 
will result in greater protection for buildings of historic significance. 
However, in the many states that enacted post-Kelo reforms with broadly 
defined blight exemptions for redevelopment condemnations, older 
buildings of historic significance remain at risk.   
Over the years, historic buildings have often been condemned or 
targeted for condemnation by governments wielding eminent domain 
powers.
115
 Condemnation plans in the historic downtowns of Pittsburgh 
and Baltimore led to inclusion of the areas in the National Trust for 
Historic Preservation‘s list of America‘s Eleven Most Endangered Historic 
Places.
116
 While these condemnation plans were eventually dropped,
117
 
older homes and churches in the Poletown neighborhood of Detroit, 
Michigan, were permanently lost in the early 1980s when razed to make 
way for a General Motors plant.
118
 In the 1950s, the historic West End 
neighborhood of Boston was razed and replaced with high rise 
apartments.
119
 Other examples of historic buildings and neighborhoods 
destroyed by eminent domain include the Block 37 neighborhood of 
Chicago
120
 and Nardi‘s Bakery and Deli in East Hartford, Connecticut.121 
Each of these demonstrates a condemnation that would be more difficult to 
effectuate in jurisdictions with strong post-Kelo reform. 
These condemnations occurred in the pre-Kelo world, when most 
jurisdictions could condemn buildings for economic redevelopment 
without first making a blight finding. However, contrary to the 
expectations of those who clamored for eminent domain reform in the 
aftermath of Kelo, condemnations such as these could still easily occur in 
                                                                                                                     
 115. In addition to local governments, authorities at the state and federal level wield 
condemnation powers as well. However, as the majority of land control and planning is at the local 
level, eminent domain is more often a tool of local government. 
 116. Fine, supra note 1, at 24. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 
(Mich. 1981), overruled by Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). For 
commentary about the Poletown neighborhood, see James Kelly, The Last Days of Poletown, TIME, 
Mar. 30, 1981, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,922498,00.html#.  
 119. For a photographic history of the West End urban renewal project, see Joseph Soares, 
Urban Renewal in Boston: The West End and Government Center, WAKE FOREST UNIV. (Feb. 7, 
1997), http://www.wfu.edu/sociology/sociallifeofcities/urban/urban.html. 
 120. REDEVELOPMENT WRECKS: 20 FAILED PROJECTS INVOLVING EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE, THE 
CASTLE COALITION, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/Redevelopment%20Wrecks.pdf. 
 121. Id. at 6. 
14
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the many jurisdictions with easily satisfied blight exemptions in their 
eminent domain reforms. As noted by Professor J. Peter Byrne, ―Most 
American cities today contain vibrant historic districts that not long ago 
were considered blighted.‖122 In jurisdictions that allow broad blight 
definitions to justify condemnations for economic redevelopment, local 
governments risk losing valuable historic resources to short-sighted 
development plans.    
Further exacerbating the risks faced to historic buildings is the 
inclusion of terms such as ―age‖ and ―obsolescence‖ as factors contributing 
to blight. As noted in Part III, thirteen of the twenty-two states with weak 
post-Kelo reforms include either ―age‖ or ―obsolescence‖ in their blight 
definitions.
123
 One commentator notes the ease in which governments may 
find blight conditions satisfied: ―Enthusiasts of historic preservation must 
cringe upon being informed that the age of a building suffices to classify it 
as blighted. . . . As for obsolescence, any structure more than a few years 
old could be labeled obsolescent if it lacks features found in newer 
structures.‖124 Another commentator observes that using age to designate 
an older building as blighted seems contrary to the goals of historic 
preservation:  
[F]or a building to be eligible for listing in the National 
Register of Historic Places it must be [] more than fifty years 
old or be of such historical or architectural importance as to 
be listed earlier. . . . Declaring older areas that are eligible or 
listed on the National Register as blight and subject to [] 
potential clearance seems contrary to Federal and Local 
Historic Preservation laws and programs. . . . [B]ecause age is 
not an indicator of whether an area may place a substantial 




                                                                                                                     
 122. J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities Under the 
Takings Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 131, 141 (2005). Other commentators note that, 
―Economic development takings may also come at the expense of historic preservation if historic 
buildings are located in areas targeted for condemnation.‖ Somin & Adler, supra note 72, at 646. 
 123. See supra Part III. 
 124. See Lefcoe, supra note 71, at 61–62. 
 125. Christopher S. Brown, Blinded by the Blight: A Search for a Workable Definition of 
“Blight” in Ohio, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 226–27 (2004). If the blight removal is part of a federally 
funded or licensed redevelopment project, § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act mandates 
that the federal agency ―take into account‖ the impacts on buildings listed for or eligible for listing 
on the National Register: 
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a 
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of 
any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any 
undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on 
the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take 
into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, 
or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The 
15
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It is arguable whether age should be disregarded altogether as a blight-
contributing factor; however, it is indisputable that giving it much weight 
in determining blight works against the interests of preservation.  
Including imprecise and over-inclusive terms in blight definitions leads 
to broad exemptions from the post-Kelo ban on private-to-private 
condemnations and has negative consequences for the preservation of the 
community. Such definitions give condemning authorities the green light 
to use blight eradication as a pretext to removing valuable and 
irreplaceable historic buildings.  
V.  EMINENT DOMAIN AS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION 
 Notwithstanding the danger eminent domain poses to historic 
preservation, it can also be a powerful tool to promote preservation and to 
save buildings of historic significance. Typically, the goals of preservation 
can be met without seizing title to a structure. A commentator describes the 
goal of historic preservation: 
[T]he end can be achieved by condemning those elements of 
the ius utendi relating to the owner‘s right to choose a design 
for the structure. The interest so acquired would be a negative 
easement . . . . Such limited condemnation is thought 
preferable by many preservationists and architects, not only 
because it is less expensive than condemnation of the fee, but 
also because it preserves the property as a ―living‖ thing 
rather than as an embalmed museum piece.
126
   
At times, however, a property‘s deterioration, its extraordinary public 
significance, or the owner‘s inability or refusal to cooperate may make 
eminent domain the preferred option.  
When the condemned property is of incontrovertible significance, such 
as a historic battlefield,
127
 the condemnation will be less controversial. 
However, condemnation of property with only local significance may 
                                                                                                                     
head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation established under part B of this subchapter a reasonable opportunity 
to comment with regard to such undertaking. 
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 106, 80 Stat. 915, 917 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006)). As it is not uncommon for a large redevelopment project 
to involve federal funds or require federal licensure, § 106 is often a relevant factor in 
condemnations of older neighborhoods for redevelopment. An example can be found in WATCH v. 
Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979), where the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) helped fund a New England urban renewal project that included plans to demolish buildings 
eligible for listing on the National Register. Id. at 314–15. HUD‘s involvement implicated § 106, 
and the court enjoined the buildings‘ demolition until the agency complied with the Act. Id. at 319–
27.   
 126. Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 708, 727–28 (1963). 
 127. E.g., United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 679–83 (1896). 
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arouse more contention. If the public use of historic preservation could be 
coupled with an additional public use, such as blight eradication, it would 
be more palatable to the local community. Such two-part justifications 
have been used in the past.
128
 In the states with strong post-Kelo reform, 
these justifications may prove problematic. 
A.  The Expansion of Historic Preservation as a Valid Public Use 
Courts subsequent to Gettysburg could have restricted their holding to 
historic battlefields, yet they did not do so. In the century since Gettysburg, 
a line of state court decisions ratified condemnations for historic 
preservation.
129
 In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
130
 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ratified a historic preservation ordinance that resulted in a 
partial condemnation of a historic structure.‖131 Though addressing 
regulation rather than condemnation of the fee, Penn Central‘s acceptance 
of New York‘s historic preservation ordinance could be seen as a tacit 
endorsement of the post-Gettysburg cases that affirmed condemnations of 
buildings for historic preservation. 
New York state courts have affirmed condemnations for historic 
preservation on several occasions.
132
 In the lower court opinion for Penn 
Central,
 the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision 
that New York‘s landmark preservation provisions were not 
unconstitutional and that the Penn Central Transportation Company had 
not been deprived of its property without due process of law.
133
 The court 
stated, ―In times of easy affluence, preservation of historic landmarks 
through use of the eminent domain power might be desirable, or even 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See, e.g., Cordova v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52, 52–53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); In re 
Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d 551, 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); City of Tacoma v. 
Zimmerman, 82 P.3d 701, 702–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 129. See, e.g., Cordova, 494 P.2d at 53–54 (citing Gettysburg for the proposition that, ―[I]t has 
long been established that a taking to preserve historic property represents a proper ‗public use.‘‖); 
Flaccomio v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 71 A.2d 12, 14 (Md. 1950) (upholding the taking 
of property near a historic landmark for the purposes of historic preservation); In re Acquisition of 
Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d at 552–53 (permitting the acquisition of property without a public 
hearing for the purpose of ―emergency stabilization and historic preservation‖); Lubelle v. City of 
Rochester, 145 A.D.2d 954, 954–55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (upholding the taking of vacant lots and 
a historic building for the purpose of historic preservation); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1278–79 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding a regulation that prohibited the 
construction of buildings upon a significant landmark); Timmons v. S.C. Tricentennial Comm‘n, 
175 S.E.2d 805, 810 (S.C. 1970) (―The validity of condemnation for parks, public squares, 
historical sites or monuments has been established in many instances.‖). 
 130. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 131. Id. at 147 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 132. See Wechsler v. N.Y. State Dep‘t of Envtl. Conservation, 564 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 
1990) (allowing acquisition for the ―over-all goal of preservation‖); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 366 
N.E.2d at 1278–79 (upholding a regulation that prohibited the construction of buildings upon a 
significant landmark); Lubelle, 145 A.D.2d at 954 (upholding the taking of vacant lots and a 
historic building for the purpose of historic preservation). 
 133. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 366 N.E.2d at 1273. 
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required.‖134 However, when eminent domain is not a viable option 
because of a city‘s financial distress, schemes preserving historic properties 
while keeping them in private hands are likewise legitimate.
135
 This 
opinion signaled a ringing endorsement of eminent domain for historic 
preservation, demonstrating not only that historic preservation is a valid 
public use, but at least in New York, it may be favored over other options. 
The state again validated historic preservation as a public use in 
Lubelle v. City of Rochester.
136
 In Lubelle, the City of Rochester used its 
eminent domain power to take the historic Hoyt-Potter House along with 
two adjoining vacant lots.
137
 Lubelle asserted that the condemnation of the 
vacant lots for parking was ―excessive and thus unconstitutional, and that 
the entire taking will not serve a public use.‖138 The court disagreed, 
holding that condemnation of the lots was ―rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose‖ and that ―there is no dispute that historic 
preservation serves a public purpose.‖139 The court further noted that 
whether the rehabilitation was worth the cost was a legislative decision, 
and thus, it would not be second-guessed by the courts.
140
  
A third New York validation of condemnation for preservation came in 
Wechsler v. New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation.
141
 In Wechsler, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the 
condemnation of 1,067 acres of the Neversink River Gorge.
142
 The court 
emphasized the ―great natural beauty‖ and ―historical[] significance‖ of the 
land.
143
 The condemning agency reasoned that the acquisition would be 
―consistent with the over-all goal of preservation.‖144 The court found this 
to be a public use and validated the agency‘s actions.145  
 Courts across the country have come to conclusions similar to those of 
the New York courts. In Flaccomio v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore,
146
 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed a decision 
allowing the taking of a house to expand the Star Spangled Banner Flag 
House in Baltimore.
147
 The contested property bordered the house where 
Mary Pickersgill made (or started to make) the flag that inspired Francis 
Scott Key to write the Star Spangled Banner.
148
 Baltimore needed the 
adjoining property to make room for a museum, and the court, relying on 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 1278. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 145 A.D.2d 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
 137. Id. at 954. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 564 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1990). 
 142. Id. at 661. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 661–62. 
 146. 71 A.2d 12 (Md. Ct. App. 1950). 
 147. Id. at 14–15. 
 148. Id. at 12–13. 
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Gettysburg, validated the action: ―The purpose for which the City of 
Baltimore is attempting to acquire the small tract of land involved in this 
case is similar in many respects to the purpose which actuated the 
Government of the United States to acquire the battle field of 
Gettysburg.‖149 
 In Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Commission,
150
 the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina cited both Flaccomio and Gettysburg in 
upholding the condemnation of a parcel to be used in South Carolina‘s 
tricentennial celebration.
151
 The lot stood in the same block as the 
antebellum Hampton-Preston mansion.
152
 During the celebration, the state 
needed the lot for parking; after the celebration, the state needed the lot to 
expand the mansion‘s gardens.153 The court stated that 
―[h]istorical . . . purposes are recognized public uses‖ and validated the 
state‘s condemnation.154  
B.  The Coupling of Historic Preservation with Blight Eradication 
 Governments have at times justified condemnations by coupling the 
public use of historic preservation with the public use of blight eradication. 
Although the added component of blight eradication is not necessary to 
constitutionally justify a condemnation for preservation, it likely makes the 
condemnation more palatable to the local community. The added 
justification of blight removal may be most beneficial in cases where the 
desired building is historical but may not have the same level of 
significance as Gettysburg or the Star Spangled Banner Flag House, or the 
same clout as a state‘s tricentennial celebration. Local governments have 





 and Albany, New York.
157
 In each of these instances, the 
local governments transferred the newly acquired fee or leasehold interests 




In Cordova v. Tucson, the City of Tucson condemned Maria Cordova‘s 
historic building as part of the Pueblo Center Redevelopment Project No. 
Arizona R-8.
158
 The project followed a finding that parts of downtown 
Tucson were blighted or slum areas and that ―redevelopment of such area 
is necessary in the interests of the public health, safety, morals, and welfare 
of the residents of the City of Tucson.‖159 Noting the historic value of 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Id. at 14. 
 150. 175 S.E.2d 805 (S.C. 1970). 
 151. Id. at 813. 
 152. Id. at 810. 
 153. Id. at 810–11. 
 154. Id. at 813. 
 155. Cordova v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52, 53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). 
 156. City of Tacoma v. Zimmerman, 82 P.3d 701, 702–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 157. In re Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d 551, 551–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 158. Cordova, 494 P.2d at 52–53. 
 159. Id. 
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Cordova‘s building, the city chose not to raze it but rather preserve the 
building and retain title.
160
 The city planned to lease the building to the 
Tucson Art Center, where it would be integrated into an art complex 
showcasing art, historic buildings, and gardens.
161
   
Though within the designated blight area, Cordova contested the city‘s 
condemnation of her property.
162
 She argued that no public use justification 
existed to condemn her property: (1) it was not slum; (2) it was not to be 
razed; and (3) it was to be leased to a private corporation.
163
 
Notwithstanding these assertions, the Arizona Court of Appeals found the 
condemnation furthered a public use and affirmed the city‘s actions.164 
The court stated that the pertinent question was not whether Cordova‘s 
building was slum but rather whether the building was in a statutorily 
defined slum area.
165
 As the building was in such an area, the court found 
no merit in Cordova‘s first argument.166 The court likewise found no merit 
in Cordova‘s second argument, stating ―condemning authorities are to be 
praised, rather than damned, for excepting from the bulldozer‘s path 
buildings and sites of historic and cultural significance.‖167 Citing both 
Gettysburg and Flaccomio, the court reiterated that historic preservation is 
a public use and that the city was on firm ground in promoting such use in 
its redevelopment plan.
168
 Lastly, the court noted that leasing the 
condemned property to a private corporation was not incompatible with the 
project‘s designation as a public use.169  
Many of the court‘s rationales for upholding the condemnation would 
not pass muster in a jurisdiction with strong post-Kelo reform. The 
conclusion that leasing to a private corporation does not negate the public 
use is no longer definitive in those jurisdictions that statutorily narrowed 
                                                                                                                     
 160. Id. at 53. 
 161. Id. at 53–54. 
 162. Id. at 52–53. 
 163. Id. at 53. Cordova also argued that the inclusion of her property was unjustified because it 
was located in a block of the redevelopment district that was set apart geographically and had been 
treated differently from the remainder of the district. Id.  
 164. Id. at 54. 
 165. Id. at 53. Like many of the blight definitions described in Part III of this Note, Arizona 
used a broad definition of slum or blight. Arizona Statutes § 36-1471(18) defined ―slum area‖ as  
an area of which a majority of the structures are residential, or an area in which 
there is a predominance of buildings or improvements, whether residential or 
nonresidential, and which, by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or 
obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, sanitation, or open 
spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, or the existence of 
conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes . . . is 
detrimental to the public health, safety, morals and welfare.  
ARIZ. STAT. § 36-1471(18) (1972).  
 166. Cordova, 494 P.2d at 53.  
 167. Id. The court also found no merit in the argument that the building‘s location and special 
treatment made inclusion in the redevelopment area unjustified. Id. 
 168. Id. at 53–54. 
 169. Id. at 54. 
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the definition of public use post-Kelo. Many jurisdictions would recognize 
a public use if, like in Tucson, the private corporation benefited the 
public.
170
 However, the Tucson court felt no need to draw such a 
distinction. In some post-Kelo jurisdictions, even transfers to private 
corporations benefitting the public are forbidden.
171
 For example, in South 
Dakota, ―No county, municipality, or housing and redevelopment 
commission . . . may acquire private property by use of eminent domain: 
(1) For transfer to any private person, nongovernmental entity, or other 
public-private business entity.‖172 Laws such as this would prevent cities in 
Tucson‘s situation from preserving historic buildings unless the buildings 
remained with the government.    
Further, some states with strong post-Kelo reform would not allow the 
condemnation of a non-blighted building solely because it fell within a 
district where other buildings were blighted.
173
 For example, since the 
2006 voter approval of Proposition 207, condemning authorities in Arizona 
must ―establish by clear and convincing evidence that each parcel is 
necessary to eliminate a direct threat to public health or safety caused by 
the property in its current condition.‖174 In 1972, however, Arizona‘s 
permissive eminent domain laws did not hamstring the state with such 
limitations. Accordingly, the Tucson court validated the condemnation and 
with it the city‘s efforts to promote art and historic preservation in the 
downtown area. 
Thirty-two years after Tucson, the appellate division of the Supreme 
Court of New York validated another coupling of blight eradication with 
historic preservation in the case of In re Acquisition of Real Property by 
City of Albany.
175
 There, the city‘s Department of Fire Emergency and 
Building Services notified the owner of the former St. Joseph‘s Church 
that the building was ―unsound and structurally unstable.‖176 The owner 
ignored the city‘s demand to vacate the premises and fix the 
deficiencies.
177
 Accordingly, the city barricaded the church and carried out 
emergency repairs to ―prevent further structural deterioration and 
catastrophic failure.‖178 The city then commenced eminent domain 
proceedings for ―emergency stabilization and historic preservation.‖179  
The church owner protested the city‘s designation of the church as 
deteriorated; however, the court ruled against the church owner in this 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2010); see also Miller & Amrhein, supra note 13 
(referencing Florida‘s statutes and noting that it exempts situations ―where private use is incidental 
to a public project‖ from the ban on conveyances to private parties).   
 171. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-22.1 (West 2010). 
 172. Id.  
 173. See, e.g., Miller & Amrhein, supra note 13, at 794–95 (discussing ARIZ. STAT. § 12-1132 
(2010)).  
 174. ARIZ. STAT. § 12-1132. 
 175. 9 A.D.3d 551, 552–53 (N.Y App. Div. 2004).  
 176. Id. at 551–52. 
 177. Id. at 552. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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 Noting that the condemning authority has broad discretion in 
defining a public purpose,
181
 the court affirmed that the condemnation 
complied with New York‘s laws and police powers.182 
Following its condemnation, the City of Albany transferred St. 
Joseph‘s Church to the private Historic Albany Foundation.183 In the years 




Like the transfer in Tucson, the transfer of St. Joseph‘s Church to a 
private organization, based in part on the church‘s blight designation, 
would raise questions in some jurisdictions with strong post-Kelo eminent 
domain reform. The public nature of the private corporation would pass 
muster under most, but not all, post-Kelo reforms. However, the use of 
blight to condemn the building would be a hurdle in many jurisdictions and 
a block against condemnation in others.  
 In the same year as the Albany decision, the Court of Appeals of 
Washington affirmed the City of Tacoma‘s coupling of blight eradication 
with historic preservation to justify the condemnation of the Old Elks 
Temple on Broadway.
185
 In Tacoma v. Zimmerman,
186
 the city found the 
Old Elks Temple to be derelict and issued numerous requests that the 
owners, Ronald and Steffi Zimmerman, make the requisite repairs.
187
 The 
Zimmermans‘ refusal to respond and the accumulation of over $1,000 in 




 Under the Tacoma Municipal Code, the issuance of a certificate of 
complaint authorizes the government to either take title to the property or 
demolish it.
189
 Eminent domain is limited to situations where ―the property 
undergoing the Derelict Building Procedure is of sufficient value to be 
repairable.‖190 The Zimmermans argued that it would be more economical 
to demolish the building and replace it with a new structure;
191
 the city 
argued that the temple‘s historic and aesthetic value warranted 
preservation.
192
 Though the court agreed with the Zimmermans‘ contention 
that the requisite value was economic value rather than historic or aesthetic 
value, the court ruled that the city could gauge economic value by looking 
past the individual building and to the aims of the historic district as a 
                                                                                                                     
 180. Id. at 552–53. 
 181. Id. at 553 (citing In re Rafferty v. Town of Colonie, 300 A.D.2d 719, 723 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002)).  
 182. Albany, 9 A.D.2d at 553. 
 183. See February 2011 St. Joseph‟s Newsletter, supra note 31. The Web site has a wealth of 
information about the history of the condemned church as well as the ongoing restoration project. 
 184. See id. 
 185. City of Tacoma v. Zimmerman, 82 P.3d 701, 702–07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 186. 82 P.3d 701. 
 187. Id. at 702–03.  
 188. Id. at 703. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 705 (citing the local ordinance) (emphasis in original). 
 191. Id. at 702–03. 
 192. Id. at 705. 
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 The court stated: 
Whether an action is ―economical‖ depends on whether the 
City‘s reasons for pursuing a project justify the project‘s 
economic cost to the City. In enacting an ordinance allowing 
the City to acquire the building through negotiation or 
eminent domain, the City cited the historic and cultural value 
of the building . . . . But, from the City‘s perspective, the 
value of the building also encompasses its relationship to the 
other buildings in the area and the district as a whole. This 
―district‖ view of value, economic and otherwise, is more 
expansive than that of the owner of a single building. And it is 
a necessary and proper perspective from which a city, as 




Thus, the court found the city was justified in choosing to preserve rather 
than to destroy the Old Elks Temple.
195
   
 Like in Tucson and Albany, the plan in Tacoma did not foresee 
retaining title in the city.
196
 The plan in Tacoma did not even foresee 
transferring title to a quasi-public entity such as a historic preservation 
foundation
197
 or an art center.
198
 The plan in Tacoma sought to transfer title 
to a successful bidder.
199
 This sort of conveyance is even more in line with 
the private-to-private transfers that states found so offensive when drafting 
post-Kelo eminent domain reforms. Such measures, though in some 
instances beneficial to historic preservation, will be forbidden in many 
states with strong post-Kelo reform.  
 A further similarity to Tucson and Albany can be found in Tacoma‘s 
eminent domain justifications based on a blight designation.
200
 In fact, the 
city‘s condemnation hinged on the blight designation.201 The city 
commenced eminent domain based on the state statute and municipal 
ordinance permitting condemnations of blighted properties.
202
 The Tacoma 
court noted that the separate statute permitting eminent domain for historic 
preservation qualified the power by noting that governments may not reach 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Id. at 706. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 707. 
 196. Id. at 704. 
 197. See February 2011 St. Joseph‟s Newsletter, supra note 31; see generally In re 
Acquisition of Real Prop. by Albany, 9 A.D.3d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (upholding the 
condemnation of the historic St. Joseph‘s Church).  
 198. See Cordova v. City of Tucson, 494 P.2d 52, 54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). 
 199. Tacoma, 82 P.3d at 704. The court cited the city as ―nam[ing] tax abatement and historic 
tax credits as examples of ways the City could make a development project be financially 
worthwhile to a prospective developer.‖ Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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buildings they would not otherwise be permitted to condemn.
203
 Therefore, 
the court held that ―until the Zimmermans allowed the property to decline 
into a blighted state, the City could not acquire it.‖204 In the post-Kelo 
world, the absence of historic preservation as a stand-alone justification for 
eminent domain would put even more emphasis on the blight definition 
used in proceedings to condemn historic structures.  
The condemnations affirmed in Tucson, Albany, and Tacoma would 
arouse greater judicial scrutiny in the jurisdictions that enacted strong post-
Kelo reform. Blight designations, conveyances to private parties, and 
condemnations of non-blighted structures in blighted neighborhoods are all 
old tools that could pose hurdles to present condemnations for preservation 
in jurisdictions with strong post-Kelo reform. If a building is truly blighted, 
most jurisdictions with strong reforms would still allow the building to be 
condemned for economic redevelopment. However, governments in these 
jurisdictions will find it harder to save historic buildings that, though not 
per se blighted, are neglected and in danger of losing their historic 
integrity. Further, in states such as Florida, New Mexico, and Utah that 
have effectively eliminated blight as an eminent domain justification, even 
truly derelict historic buildings will be more difficult to condemn in the 
name of preservation.
205
 In this respect, the post-Kelo eminent domain 
reforms may have eliminated a powerful tool for the preservation 
community.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Kelo decision led to considerable speculation about the probable 
effects on historic preservation. Shortly after Kelo, National Trust for 
Historic Preservation Vice President and general counsel Paul Edmondson 
stated that, ―[I]t is important to acknowledge that eminent domain is a tool 
that can be used to promote historic preservation, but on the other hand to 
acknowledge that it can harm . . . (often in the guise of eliminating 
‗blight‘).‖206 State preservation groups, both before and after Kelo, made 
                                                                                                                     
 203. Id. at 704 n.6. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra notes 105–07 accompanying text.  
 206.  See Memorandum from Paul Edmondson, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Nat‘l Trust 
for Historic Preservation, Some Thoughts About the Kelo Decision for Members of the Historic 
Preservation Community 4 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://www.preservationnation .org/ 
issues/transportation/additional-resources/kelo-eminent-domain-nthp-commentary.pdf. 
Edmondson continued that, 
It is incumbent on preservationists to be active in promoting the former and 
opposing the latter. From either perspective, legislative reforms that would 
eliminate the tool in its entirety—–to end any use of eminent domain to promote 
economic development—–should not be necessary to correct abuse, but reforms 
designed to increase transparency, encourage community involvement in planning, 
and increase attention to protecting neighborhood character would go a long way 
in helping to ensure that the tool is not misused. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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similar observations on eminent domain and historic preservation.
207
 In the 
wake of the post-Kelo reforms, eminent domain will likely continue to cut 
both ways for historic preservation. Legislators will need to find creative 
solutions to balance the needs of property rights advocates who oppose 
condemnation for economic redevelopment with the needs of the 
preservation community that strives to restore and protect historic 
structures in disrepair.  
In the states with weak eminent domain reform, historic preservation 
advocates should lobby to narrow or eliminate the post-Kelo blight 
exemptions to the ban on economic redevelopment condemnations so that 
they do not apply to historic sites. Section 106 of the National Historic 
Preservation Act already mandates that federal agencies ―take into 
account‖ the impacts on historic buildings if federal funding or licensure is 
involved in a condemnation project.
208
 If states went a step further, historic 
buildings could be protected regardless of whether a project has federal 
involvement.  
Rather than solely ―tak[ing] into account‖ the condemnation‘s effects 
on a historic building, preservation advocates in states with weak post-Kelo 
reform should push for language barring the use of blight as a justification 
for economic redevelopment condemnations of buildings listed on or 
eligible for listing on a historic preservation register where such 
condemnations threaten the destruction of those sites. Drafters of such a 
statute could adopt Florida‘s broad prohibition against blight eradication as 
an eminent domain justification, replacing Florida‘s reference to ―private 
property‖209 with the National Historic Preservation Act‘s reference to ―any 
district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for 
                                                                                                                     
 207. See Gregory B. Paxton, Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation Asks „Where Does 
Eminent Domain Fit Into the Preservation Puzzle?,‟ GA. TRUST, 
http://www.georgiatrust.org/news/preservation_issues/eminent_domain.php (last visited Apr. 15, 
2011) (―While eminent domain has often been used to eliminate historic buildings in disrepair, 
long-term vacant parcels have often resulted. Condemnation also can be—and has been—used to 
protect historic resources.‖); see also Eminent Domain: Good or Bad for Historic Places?, CONN. 
TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, http://www.cttrust.org/1855?highlight=cpn (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). Commentators have also made similar observations. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 1, at 22–
26. Commentators have also discussed eminent domain as a double-edged sword when viewed from 
the perspective of the environmental community. See Somin & Adler, supra note 72, at 665. 
From an environmental perspective, eminent domain is a two-edged sword. It can 
be used to provide environmental public goods and preserve undeveloped land. At 
the same time, however, it can also be used to condemn farms, extinguish 
conservation easements, subsidize unsound development, and pave the way for 
suburban expansion into the countryside. 
Id. 
 208. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, § 106, 80 Stat. 915, 917 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006)). 
 209. See FLA. STAT. § 73.014(2) (2010). Florida‘s statute states, ―[T]he state, any political 
subdivision . . . , or any other entity to which the power of eminent domain is delegated may not 
exercise the power of eminent domain to take private property for the purpose of preventing or 
eliminating slum or blight conditions.‖ Id. 
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inclusion in the National Register.‖210 The language could be expanded to 
include structures listed on or eligible for listing on state and local 
registers. Thus, the statute could read: 
The state, any political subdivision, or any other entity to 
which the power of eminent domain is delegated may not 
exercise the power of eminent domain to take any district, 
site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible 
for inclusion in any federal, state, or municipal register for 
historic preservation for the purpose of preventing or 
eliminating slum or blight conditions.  
 The state would want to allow condemnations if the purpose were 
preservation rather than economic redevelopment. Therefore, the drafters 
would need to follow this provision by stating,  
Notwithstanding this prohibition, a condemning authority 
may exercise the power of eminent domain to take a district, 
site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible 
for inclusion in any federal, state, or municipal register for 
historic preservation if the stated goal of the condemnation is 
the historic preservation of the condemned property. 
Amending a state‘s weak eminent domain statute in this regard would 
protect historic buildings from shortsighted redevelopment plans yet 
would minimize the protestations of legislators unwilling to hamstring the 
state‘s condemnation powers.  
Conversely, in the states with strong eminent domain reform, historic 
preservation advocates should press legislatures to allow more flexibility 
in condemnations for preservation of buildings listed on or eligible for 
listing on national, state, or local registers for historic preservation. 
Statutes could be amended to allow for condemnations in order to preserve 
buildings that fall short of meeting stringent blight definitions but fail to 
maintain their historic integrity. Stringent blight definitions could apply in 
all other situations. 
This could be accomplished by inserting language after a state‘s strict 
blight definition that allows for more leniency when the structure is a 
historic building. For example, a state‘s statute could first define blight in 
regards to stringent factors such as where a building ―constitutes a public 
nuisance,‖ ―is unfit for human habitation,‖ or ―is otherwise dangerous to 
the safety of persons or property.‖211 The statute could then draw language 
from the National Historic Preservation Act and from a weakly reformed 
state statute and provide,  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 210. § 106, 80 Stat. at 917. 
 211. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-7 (West 2010); Somin, supra note 11, at 2140 n.187 
(discussing the Indiana provision). 
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Notwithstanding this general definition of blight, a district, 
site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible 
for inclusion in any federal, state, or municipal register for 
historic preservation that is targeted for condemnation for 
preservation will constitute blight for purposes of eminent 
domain if, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, lack of 
ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, deleterious land use, 
or any combination of these or other factors, it is detrimental 
to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.
212
 
Another way to provide a more lenient definition of blight for 
preservation of historic buildings would be to modify the factors that must 
be aggregated to support a blight finding. Colorado‘s blight statute, though 
arguably a weak effort at reform, is illustrative of a statute that defines 
―blight‖ as an aggregate of factors that could be modified if the targeted 
structure were historic.
213
 The statute defines blight as an area that ―by 
reason of the presence of at least four of the following factors, substantially 
impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the 
provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social 
liability, and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare . . . .‖214 The statute then lists eleven factors to consider, including 
things such as whether the proposed condemnation includes ―[s]lum, 
deteriorated, or deteriorating structures,‖ ―[a p]redominance of defective or 
inadequate street layout,‖ ―[f]aulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, 
accessibility, or usefulness,‖ or ―[u]nsanitary or unsafe conditions.‖215 This 
statute could be amended to better facilitate the goals of historic 
preservation by adding the following language:  
Notwithstanding this provision, if the proposed condemnation 
is a district, site, building, structure, or object that is included 
in or eligible for inclusion in any federal, state, or municipal 
register for historic preservation, and if the purpose of the 
proposed condemnation is historic preservation, the presence 
of only three of the aforementioned factors is sufficient to 
satisfy a finding of blight. 
Rather than adding this provision, another means to facilitate 
condemnations for preservation would be to add a twelfth factor to be 
considered: ―The proposed condemnation is a district, site, building, 
structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in any 
federal, state, or municipal register for historic preservation, but only if the 
purpose of the proposed condemnation is historic preservation.‖ Amending 
                                                                                                                     
 212. This provision combines language from § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 
§ 106, 80 Stat. at 917, with language drawn from Tennessee‘s blight definition, TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 13-20-201(a) (West 2010). 
 213. COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-103 (West 2010). 
 214. Id. § 31-25-103(2). 
 215. Id. § 31-25-103(2)(a)–(d). 
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post-Kelo reforms in any of these regards could minimize the protestations 
of property rights advocates while adding crucial protection to historically 
significant buildings. Unless the strong post-Kelo reforms are reanalyzed in 
light of the needs of preservation, the same states that have added a layer of 
protection to historic buildings may have stripped a layer of protection as 
well.  
As the law stands, the post-Kelo reforms both facilitate and hinder 
historic preservation. In the states with weak reform, historic buildings 
remain at risk of shortsighted condemnations for economic redevelopment. 
However, governments in these states retain wide powers to condemn 
historic buildings for historic preservation. In the states with strong reform, 
the condemnation of older neighborhoods in the name of economic 
redevelopment will be harder to effectuate than it was pre-Kelo. However, 
it will be harder to save historic buildings that are not blighted yet are 
neglected and falling into disrepair. Eminent domain remains a double-
edged sword for historic preservation. 
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